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Two years into the Asian financial crisis, fears that economic
recession in the region will be prolonged have abated. A recent
report by the Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) now projects a higher growth of the global economy in 1999
than was previously predicted. Th e US economy continues to surge
and the threat of the Asian crisis spilling into Latin America did not
materialize. South Korea's and other Asian Countries' economic
growth recovered earlier than expected and Japan has embarked on
an ambitious fiscal stimulus package as reforms in the financial sector
are being adopted.
The first quarter 1999 economic indicators for the Philippines
also point to a recovery. Better than average weather conditions
usually expected after a severe drought caused by El Ni71ohas led to
the strong performance of the agriculture sector. This was especially
the case for rice, corn, and other annual crops that benefited from
the unusually rainy dry season which raised both yields and
cropping intensities. Remittances from abroad accelerated indicating
greater confidence in the economy. The declining trend of gross
value added in manufacturing has slowed to -1% compared to the
previous quarter's -3.5%. Imports, particularly of raw materials and
capital equipment, rose suggesting that producers are gearing up
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for domestic economic activities as the exchange rate stabilized at
levels below 40 to $1. Inflation rates remained manageable and
interest rates have declined.
The 1998 economic recession in the Philippines, which reduced
gross domestic product (GDP) by -0.5% (GNP increased by 0.13%),
was not as severe as those experienced in South Korea (-5.5%),
Malaysia (-6%), Thailand (-8%), Indonesia (-13.7%), Hongkong
(-5%) (ADB 1999). The country actually suffered deeper economic
recessions in 1984 (-7.4%), 1985 (-7.2%), and 1991 (-0.6%) due to
unsustainable imbalances in macroeconomic fundamentals and to
the political turmoil leading to the downfall of the Marcos regime
in the early 1980s.
As in the other East Asian economies, structural weaknesses in
the financial sector have been important factors contributing to the
recent Philippine economic recession. These include inadequate
policies in handling large surges of mainly short-term capital flows,
as well as subsequent "contagion" effects in the region (Intal and
Medalla 1998; Lamberte and Yap 1999). Were it not for the severe
drought due to the E! Ni_o, gross domestic product could have
managed to grow but at a much slower pace than in 1997. Gross
value added in agriculture declined by 6.5% in 1998, the sharpest
fall in the economic performance of the sector on record. Crop
production as a whole dropped, especially those of the four leading
crops-rice (-24%), corn (-12%), coconut (-13%), and sugar (-14%).
Over the past two decades, Philippine economic growth has been
erratic and lower than most developing countries in Asia. Indeed,
a slowdown of the manufacturing sector was already evident in early
1997 before the Asian financial crisis actually began (Lamberte et al.
1999). The agricultural sector, which continues to account for more
than 20% of gross domestic product and over 40% of employment,
has not performed very well since the 1980s (Table 1). The slower
growth of Philippine agriculture compared to other Asian countries
suggests that the country has been losing its competitive advantage
in the sector. Indeed, the ratio of agricultural imports to agricultural
exports has increased from 30%to 160% by 1996. This means thatDAVID" FOODSECURITY 3




GDP GVA Agrq GDP GVA Agr'l GDP GVA Agr'l
exports exports exports
Philippines 6.4 4.9 14.6 1,0 1,0 -4.6 3.2 1.6 6,4
Indonesia 8.2 2.0 20.0 5.5 4.9 4.7 7.6 3.3 13.3
Malaysia 8.7 6.5 19,3 5,3 3,8 3.1 8.7 2.0 11,5
Thailand 7.3 4.2 21,2 8,7 3.9 4.9 8.0 2,9 7,9
India 4,0 1,8 i4,6 5.5 3.2 0.8 6,1 2.8 10.8
Pakistan 5,2 3.0 13,8 6.0 4.3 3,2 4,8 3.6 -4.0
Bangladesh 5.6 1.4 2,6 3,9 1.9 -1.5 4,5 1,7 -1.6
a Includes crops, livestock and poultry, fishery, and forestry,
b Data refer to 1990-1996.
Source of basic data: ADB Key Indicators, various issues.
FAO Trade Yearbook
the sector has shifted from being a net earner to a net importer of
foreign exchange (Table 2). Also, the measures of revealed
comparative advantage in agriculture as a whole and for all major
agricultural exports have declined sharply (Table 3).
In the late 1980s, serious attempts were made to reform the policy
and institutional distortions introduced during the two decades of
the Marcos regime. Export taxes; the copra export ban; government
monopoly over international trade in coconut oil, corn, soybeans,
soybean meal; and marketing of sugar were removed. Import
controls on fertilizers were lifted. To facilitate the necessary
streamlining of the agricultural bureaucracy, all the agriculture-
related agencies originally under the Office of the President, such
as the National Food Authority (NFA), the National Sugar Trading
Authority (NASUTRA)-IX_V the Sugar Regulatory Office (SRA), and
the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), were transferred to the
Department of Agriculture. These agencies were responsible for the
most destructive policy distortions during the Marcos rule.4 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE .DEVELOPMENT
Table 2. Agriculture's share in total imports m3dexports and ratio of agricultural
Imports to exports, 1960-96 (%)a.
% share to total Imports
imports Exports Exports
1960. 19 64 31
1965 21 63 36
1970 14 44 34
1975 10 54 26
1980 8 35 31
1985 9 26 46
1990 10 15 ' 96
1995 8 11 1'26
1996 7 . ._9. 160
Agricultural imports include imported nonagricultural.inpt_Lt_l such as agricultural
chemicals, machineries and fertilizers.
Source," FAO Trade Yearbook
To ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits resulting
from agriculture and natural resource development, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was launched
encompassing both private and designated public lands. To address
the serious threat posed by forest and watershed denudation and
dwindling fishery resources on the sustainability of agriculture and
the ecosystems in general, the government raised forest charges,
limited logging, and embarked on an aggressive expenditure
program for rehabilitation and improved management offorest and
fishery resources.
Unfortunately, institutional reforms to raise efficiency of the
agricultural bureaucracy proved difficult to fully implement.
Unintended negative effects resulted in some reform measures and
new policy initiatives. !And price distortions .were exacerbated by
efforts to circumvent the spirit of agricultural trade policy reforms
under the GATT-UR Agreement. The passage of the AgriculturalDAVID'FOODSECURITY 5
Table 3, Trends in revealed comparative advantage in agricultural and selected
Maior agricultural exports, 1960-95. a
Pineapple
Agriculture b Coconut Sugarc Banana (canned)
1960 3.0 -
1965 2.7 131.8 15.3
1970 2.6 145.0 21.4
1975 3.8 211.2 22.0 29.3
1980 2.9 224.1 12.1 30.4 82.2
1985 2.4 212.3 7.6 31.2 91.6
1990 1.6 212.3 3.8 23,4 70.2
1995 1,1 153.5 2.0 14.1 41.5
aEstimated as the ratio of the share of a commodity group in a country's exports to
that commodity group's share of world exports.
b Includes crops, livestock, poultry, and fisheries.
cNote that the sugar has been historically exported Lothe US typically at the premium price
(i.e., higher than world prices). Hence a value greater than unity m this case does not reveal
comparative advantage. However, the sharp declining trend may stillbe interpreted as a
rapid deterioration in comparative advantage.
Note: Except for 1960,all are 3-year averages centered atyear shown.
Source of basicdata:FAO Trade Yearbook
and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA or RA 8435) in early 1998
provided for the necessary policy and institutional reforms and
public expenditure program to achieve food security. And at the
beginning Of the Estrada administration, the attainment of food
security was declared as the central program of the new government.
Food security is often confused with self-sufficiency in the
production of rice and corn, overlooking that the goal of food security
is for the benefit of all Filipinos, particularly the poor. Also, the
production of rice and corn is not the dominant, and definitely not
the only source of current and potential income of farm households
who grow these crops. It should also be emphasized that food
security as a goal is meaningful only at the household level. This
goal aims to ensure that for all households, particularly the rural
and urban poor households, food is available at prices they can
afford.6 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Rapid, sustainable, and equitable agricultural growth is a
necessary condition for the attainment of food security because a
large proportion of the poor are based in the rural sector. Increasing
agricultural price protection will. not lead to overall food security.
High food prices hurt the food security of the large majority of the
poor, including fisherfolks, nonrice and Corn farmers, landless rural
households and urban households who are the net buyers of food
and for whom cost of food constitutes a high proportion of their
total expenditures. And distorted price incentives lead to lower
agricultural income for the sector and for the economy as a whole.
Instead, market failures pervasive in the agricultural sector can be
addressed better with (a) appropriate policies with respect to trade
and exchange rate, financial markets, intellectual property, biosafety,
food safety, etc.; (b) cost-effective public expenditure programs in
research and extension, irrigation, market infrastructure, regulatory
instruments, etc.; and (c) efficient institutional frameworks for
property rights, government bureaucracy, etc. These market failures
arise from instability of domestic and world markets, public good
nature and strong economies of Scale of certain inputs and
technologies and their generation, imperfect information, and
externalities in agricultural production and consumption.
A year after the start of the Estrada administration, no coherent
agenda for action and reforms to address the accumulation of policy
and institutional failures has been articulated. Public expenditure
for agriculture is supposed to increase. However, this will largely
go to waste without reforms in trade and financial market policies;
improvements in the quality of government programs; reallocation
of expenditures across programs; major changes in the budgetary
and program planning process; rationalization and st-;eamlining of
the bureaucracy; and so forth.
With a few exceptions, there is little evidence that agricultural
policies and institutions are moving in the right direction. On the
contrary, a number of major policy actions are definitely in the wrong
direction, such asthe transfer of the NFA and NABCOR from the
Department of Agriculture to the Office of the President. AttemptsDAVID :FOODSECURITY,[ 7
to do this to other agencies and programs, such as the NFAC, SRA,
Competitive Enhancement Fund, etc., will further centralize the
•distribution of corrupting rents and dispensation of political favors,
perpetuate ineffective government programs, and prevent the
necessary rationalization and streamlining of the agricultural
bureaucracy. Plans for the government to invest or provide loan or
price guarantees in agricultural joint ventures or build-operate-
transfer projects in what are properly private enterprise operations,
such as agricultural production or processing, are very disturbing.
It is, therefore, imperative that the constraints to attaining food
security be properly analyzed. The following sections of this paper
will examine how trade and price policies, public expenditure
programs, and structure of property rights have hindered the
achievement of a sustainable agricultural development and thus,
food security for all households.
DISTORTIONS IN ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Distortions in the relative prices of agricultural outputs and
inputs arising from trade and exchange rate policies cause
inefficiencies in resource allocation within the agricultural sector,
between agriculture and nonagricultural sectors, and between
tradeable and nontradeable goods.
Past studies have amply demonstrated that up to the early 1980s,
price intervention policies, both economy-wide and commodity-
specific, have created an incentive structure that is significantly
biased against agriculture (David 1983; Bautista 1987; Intal and
Power 1991). Moreover, that bias has been primarily through the
overvaluation of the peso due to the industrial protection system
and other economy-wide policies to defend an unsustainable deficit
in the balance of payments.
Economy-wide Policies
Since the• early 1980s, the government has adopted various
structural adjustment and stabilization measures to correct
fundamental distortions in the economic incentives and imbalances8 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
in the external and public sector accounts. Included here are trade
policy reforms to remove quantitative trade restrictions and reduce
the level and dispersion of tariffs, liberalization of the foreign
exchange market, and others. As.a result, the 20-30% overvaluation
of.the exchange rate from 1960 up to the rnid-1980s dropped down
to 20% by 1992 (Table 4). This rate of overvaluation of the peso is "
still sizeable, thereby imposing a substantial penalty against
agricultural profitability particularly on exportable agricultural
commodities.
Furthermore, the real effective exchange rates appreciated
sharply (30%) between 1991 and 1996 that tended to lower relative
price s of tradeable agricultural products (Figure 1). This unfavorable
trend was caused by several factors. First, trade liberalization which
should reduce distortions in the exchange rate was not accompanied
by appropriate nominal exchange rate adjustments and other
macroeconomic policies (.Medalla et al. 1995). Second, short-term
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Figure 1. Trends in the real exchange rate, 1960-98
foreign capital inflows attracted by high interest rates due to the
tight monetary regime accommodated an increase in the current
account deficit causing the real exchange rate to appreciate (de Dios
and Associates 1993; Lamberte 1995). Finally, domestic inflation
rates were higher than those Oftrading partners, particularly in 1995
when sharp increases in food prices led to double-digit inflation.
In late 1997, with the substantial devaluation of the peso and
the success in controlling inflation, the real exchange rate began to
increase. By early 1998, the real exchange rate have risen by more
than 40%, benefiting the tradeable goods sector, including the
exportable and, potentially, the import-competing agricultural
commodities as their competitive advantage increases. Relative
prices of these commodities are expected to rise as their market
demands simultaneously expand.
Commodity-specific Policies
A wide variety of policy instruments directly affect agricultural
output and input prices. Although import tariffs are generally levied
on all agricultural products and inputs, their protective effect is10 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVEL_MENT
limited as tariff protection is essentially redundant on exportable
and nontradeable commodities. Up until 1995, nontariff barriers-
quantitative trade restrictions, import prohibitions, price controls,
and government monopoly control in international trade-have
been the dominant commodity-specific policy interventions in
agricultural output markets. Tariffs are more commonly applied
on inputs and agricultural products which are not locally produced
in any significant quantity. Except in the aftermath of the
devaluation in 1970 and the sharp increases in world commodity
prices in the mid-1970s, there have been few attempts to intervene
in the production and trade of exportable agricultural products.
Trends in the nominal protection rates (NPRs) of major
agricultural commodities indicate that exportable commodities
received no price protection (Table5). The changing rates of nominal
protection over timereflect, to some extent, government's attempts
to stabilize domestic prices. The low and negative NPRs for
exportable commodities ranging from -4%to -28 %during the 1970s
were in response to the devaluation and the subsequent boom in
world prices. The continued low or negative rates of protection in
the early 1980s, despite the sharp drop in world prices since the late
1970S,indicated the practical difficulties of protecting producers of
exportable commodities from low world prices and abandoning,
policies that had outlived their original purpose as vested interests
are created.
However, it is clear that since the early 1980s, there has been an
upward trend in the nominal protection rates, particularly among
the major import-competing agricultural commodities. Sugar has
been historically the most highly protected, initially bbcause of the
country's access to the US premium market. By the late 1980s,
domestic prices of sugar have been about equal and often higher
than export prices to the US,and about double the CIF world prices.
Corn also has had one of the highest nominal protection rates
together with sugar and chicken. NPR for rice has also risen; it
reached about 65% in 1995and 1996, reflecting a drastic reversal of
rice price policy from the historically pro-urban to pro-farm bias.DAVID'FOODSECURITY 11
Table 5. Trends in nominal protection rates of major agricultural commodities,
1970-98 (%1."
1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995c 1996c 1997_ 1998c
Rice -4 -13 16 19 63 91 82 34
Corn 24 26 67 76 104 54 96 72
Sugarb 5 42 154 81 91 93 66 99
Coconut products
Copra -17 -28 -6 0 0 0 0 0
Coconut off -4 -4 7 18 10 5 0 0
Desiccated coconut, -4 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0
copra cake,
and copra meal
Bananas, Pineapple, -4 -4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tobacco, abaca
Pork 6 -9 43 31 44 na na na
Chicken 34 46 39 74 84 na na na
aNPR is the percentage difference between domestic wholesale price and border price
converted by the official exchange rate. The border price is an FOB export unit valu_ for
exportable products and the world price adjusted by 15%as a measure of CIF import unit
value for importable products. In the case of pork aaldchicken, theCIFimport unit value
ofSingapore wasused.
bWeightedaverage ofNPR onsugar exported totheUS (ratio ofexport unit value totheUS
tothe border) price andNPR onsugar for domestic use(ratio ofdomestic wholesale price to
border price). Border price is theFOB worldprice ofsugar adjusted by1596 toobtain the
CIFprice.
cImports ofrice, sugar, andrecently corn, didnotpayeither the in-quota onout-quota tariffs,
except for imports ofsugar in late 1998, whichpaidout-quota tariffs.
Source of basicdata:World Bank
National Statistics Office
The 1997 devaluation may be expected to reverse the rising trend
of the NPRs as the government try to protect domestic consumers
from sharp increases in food prices. The nominal protection rates
for rice and corn (andmost likely also pork and chicken) did decline
in 1998. The government simply authorized more imports to prevent
domestic prices from rising, a very important consideration in an
election year. Figures 2 and 3 show the real prices of rice and corn
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Figure Z:TrendLs in domestic and world prices of rice, corn, and sugar, in real terms, 1970-98.*

































































































increased significantly in 1998 to an average of about 100%, and
even much higher (more than 200%) in some months. Not
surprisingly, the real price of sugar, an import-competing
commodity, rose along with the exportable products such as coconut
off and copra as well as beef where import restrictions are relatively
lax.
Trends in Terms of Trade
Increases in the nominal protection rates have been sufficiently
high to counter the declining trend in the relative price of agriculture
to nonagriculture products in the world market and the appreciations
in the real effective exchange rates in the 19909 as evidenced by the
more gradual decline in the domestic terms of trade of agriculture
since the 19809 (Figure 4). Indeed, many major import-competing
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Figure4.Trendsin therealworld (Tw)anddomestic (Td)agriculture/
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nominal protection after considering the indirect disprotective effects
of the overvaluation of the exchange rate. In the case of corn, sugar,
and chicken, the net price protection still exceeded 50%, even higher
than most manufacturing industries. Similarly, the rice sector has
become highly protected by 1995. In fact, the following section will
show that tariff rates increased significantly on many major import-
competing agricultural commodities, which altogether accounted
for 50 to 60% of domestic agricultural production.
On the other hand, exportable agricultural commodities continue
to be penalized by the overvaluation of the exchange rate that has
worsened in the 1990s due to the steep appreciation of the real
exchange rate in that period. Although the recent devaluation raised
the real effective exchange rate, the domestic terms of trade in
agriculture declined slightly in 1997 and 1998, reflecting the
government's decision to allow more imports among those
effectively subject to quantitative trade restrictions.
Effective Protection Rates
Resource allocation is affected by the effective rates of protection
which measure not only the policy effects on output prices, but also
its effects on intermediate input prices. For agricultural crops, the
proportion of the cost of intermediate inputs to the value of output
is still relatively low. Hence, trends in the nominal and effective
rates of protection may not differ significantly. Given the declining
trend in nominal protection rates of inputs to agricultural crops
(Table 6), the effective rates of protection would have risen even
faster than nominal protection rates. The favorable impact of trade
liberalization in agricultural inputs can be observed in the falling
trends in the real prices of farm machineries, agricultural chemicals
and fertilizers in contrast to the rising real wages (Figure 5). In the
case of livestock and poultry, effective rates of protection may not
have increased as much as NPRs because the implicit tariff on corn,
the mos_important ingredient in animal feeds, rose at a higher rate.
While the dispersion of protection rates within the agricultural
sector has widened, the difference in the estimated average rates of16 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 6. Trends in implicit tariffs on agricultural inputs, 1970-98 (%).
Fertilizer_ Pesticide _ Tractors b Threshers bc Water
Urea Anunophos 2 wheel 4 wheel pumps
1970-74 -13 -9 29 21 21 24 46
1975-79 28 54 35 46 24 24 46
1980-84 21 19 35 46 24 24 46
1985-89 11 15 20 30 10 30 0
1990-94 5 12 16 28 10 22 24
1995 5 na 3(10) a 10 10 20 10
1996 3 3 3(10) 10 10 10 10
1997 3 3 3(10) 10 10 10 10
1998 3 3 3 10 10 8' 10
"Based on price comparisons, i.e., percentage difference between ex-warehouse price and
CIF import unit value.
bBased on book rates. Implicit tariff from 1960 to 84 includes theimport tariff and advance
sales tax (10% and 25% mark-up). The advance sales tax was abolished in 1986 and hence
the implicit tariff from 1985 onwards include only the tariff rate.
c Includes also other farm implements produced domestically.
d Figure in parenthesis (10%) refer to insecticides and the 3% refer to herbicide, fungicides
and other agricultural chemicals.
, Changed to 5% effective July 10,1998 by EO 486.
Source of basic data: National Statistics Office
Tariff Code
World Bank
1980- 100 1080- t00
200 200
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effective rates of protection between agriculture and manufacturing
has narrowed (Table 7). During the 1970s and 1980s, estimates of
effective rates of protection of the manufacturing sector ranged from
44% to 79%, much higher than those for agriculture which ranged
from 5% to 9% (Tan 1979; Medalla et al. 1995). By the mid-1990s, the
average effective rates of protection between agriculture and
manufacturing were about equal_Mana_san and Querubin (1997). This
has been,mainly due to declining protection rates of manufacturing,
incI_ding agricultural inputs, increasing rates of protection among
the major import-competing agricultural products, and decreasing
share of exportable agricultural commodities. Projected estimates
of effective rates of protection, in fact, indicate that the agricultural
sector would have higher rates of effective protection relative to
manufacturing given the scheduled reductions in tariff rates up to
the year 2000.
Table 7. Estimated effective protection rates by major sectors (%).
Agriculture, Fishery Manufacturing All Sector
and Forestry
Tan 9.0 44.0 36.0
1994
Medalla et al.
1983 10,3 79,2 52.8
1985 9.2 74,1 49,3
1986 5,0 61.2 39,8
1988 5,2 55.5 36.3
Manasa_ (Preliminary)
1993-95 24,4 29.1 26.7
(28.1)
2000 19.1 19.2 18.4
(25,9)
Sources:Tan (1979);Medalla et aL (1995);Manasan and Querubin (1997)
Note: Figures in parenthesis refer to crops and livestock only.18 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
WTO Agreement
The country's membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) could have set a decisive path towards an efficient price
intervention framework for Philippine agriculture, as well as
improve market access and world prices of the country's agricultural
exports. Unfortunately, the specific agreement itself and the manner
of implementation thus far suggest that virtually none of these
potential benefits will be forthcoming unless drastic redirection of
government policies is achieved.
First of all, the rice sector, one of the most heavily regulated
commodities, has been exempted from tariffication for the next 10
years, similar to the Case of Japan and South Korea. This is because
rice, as a food staple, is a politically sensitive issue.
Second, while the quantitative trade restrictions were lifted on
April 1996, these were replaced by applied tariffs that are equal to
the high binding tariffs (EO 313), the maximum tariffs committed
under the WTO. As Table 8 indicates, those binding tariffs of mostly
100% are typically higher than the nominal protection rates received
under the regime of quantitative trade restrictions. These are also
higher than book tariff rates under the earlier EO 470 which
programmed the unilateral tariff reductions of a wide range of
agricultural and industrial goods. Moreover, tariffs on a number of
imported agricultural products considered close substitutes for
commodities (e.g., feed wheat and barley as substitutes for corn)
wher e QRs are to be lifted were raised. Although.the applied tariffs
are scheduled to decrease over the next 10 years for these
commodities, they will only be about equal to or higher than tariffs
rates in 1995 under EO 470. This is definitely much higher than the
target average tariff of 5 % at the end of that period (Table 9).
Third, the administration of the minimum access Volume (MAV)
provision of the Agreement has inevitably resulted in rent-seeking,
inequities, high bureaucratic costs, and inefficiencies in allocating
government revenues generated from importations. With the MAV
provision, a tariff quota system has been established where a certain
quantity of a number of agricultural commodities may be importedDAVID" FOODSECURITY 19
Table 8. Nominal protection rates, book tariff rate, and GATF binding tariff
and minimum requirements for 1995 and 2005.
NPR EO 470 Binding tariff Minimum access
1990-94 1995 1995 2005 Tariff Quantity (000 mt)
(%) (_) 1995 20o4
Rice 19 50 na na 50 59.73 238.94
Corn 76 20 100 50 35 130.16 216.94
Sugar 80 50 100 50 50 38.43 103.40
Coffee 50 50 0.06 0.06
Garlic 30 100 40
Onions 30 100 40 30 1.61 2.68
Potatoes 30 100 40 50 930 1550
Cabbage 30 100 40 30 2.10 3.51
Pork 31 30 100 60 30 32.52 54.21
Poultry meat 74 50 100 50 14.09 23.49
Beef 30 30 4.00 5.57
000 heads
Live hogs 30 2570.00 2570.00
Live poultry 40 5708.12 9513.54
Cattle 30 12.20 20.34
Source: David 0994)
at a relatively low (in-quota) tariff rate, and others will have to pay
the higher applied (out-quota) tariff rate. Since most of the MAV
volumes are much lower than import demand at the in-quota tariff,
large quota rents are created unless the rights to import the MAV
volume are auctioned and granted on the basis of the highest bid.
The few exceptions are the high MAVs for live animals, which, as
the Department of Agriculture claims, are merely clerical errors and
are now being negotiated for technical correction.20 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Table 9, Summary of out-quota tariffs of agricultural commodities under EO 313(%)
April July ;._
1996, 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Corn (whole grains) 100 100 80 80 65 65
(35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35)
Corn (worked grains, i.e. hulled, 100 100 80 80 60 60
rolled flaked, pearled, slice, etc.)
Sorghum 60 60 50 50 45 45
Rye, Barley, Oats 40 40 35 35 ' 35 35
Buckwheat, millet and other 50 50 45 45 45 45
cereals; groats and meal of corn,
wheat and other cereals;
worked grains (barley, oats,
others); other preparations of
a "kind used in animal feeding
Oats & rice groats and meal 50 45 45 45 45 45
Corn bran, sharps and other 30 30 25 25 25 25
residues; corn oil cake and
other solid residues
'Sugar (raw cane or beef sugar not 100 100 80 80 65 65
containing flavouring or (50) (50) (50) (50) (50) (50)
coloring matter; other sugar
Sugar (containing added 70 70 60 60 55 55
flavouring or coloring matter)
Coffee (all kinds) 100 100 80 80 60 60
(50) (50) (45) (45) (45) (45)
Extracts, essence and concentrates 100 100 80 80 65 65
of coffee, tea or mate and (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
preparations thereof , ,
Potatoes, fresh or chilled 100 100 80 80 60 60
(50) (50) (45) (45) (45) (45)
Onions, shallots, garlic, leaks and 100 100 80 80 65 60
other alliceous vegetables (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
fresh or chilled; cabbages,
cauliflowers and other similar
edible brassicas, fresh or chilled
Manioc (cassava); sweet potatoes 50 50 45 45 45 45DAVID :FOODSECURITY 21
con't. Table 9.
April July
1996 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Live bovine animals; live swine of more 40 40 40 40 35 35
than 50 kg (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Live swine; (less than 50 kg); live sheep 60 60 50 50 45 45
and goats (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Live poultry 80 80 65 65 50 50
(40) (40) (40) (40) (40) (40)
Meat of bovine animals; meat of sheep 60 60 50 50 45 45
or goat (all) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Meat of swine (all) 100 100 80 80 60 60
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Meat of poultry (all except) 100 100 80 80 60 60
(50) (50) (45) (45) (45) (45)
Meat of turkey ("other") 50 50 45 45 45 45
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Meat of geese or guinea fowls 60 60 50 50 45 45
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Offals of ducks, geese, a 80 80 65 65 50 50
guinea fowls except liver (50) (50) (45) (45) (45) (45)
Processed meat (all types) 100 100 80 80 65 65
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) (30)
Somc_': Tariff Code
Note: Figures in parenthesis are in-quota tariffs,
Overall, the Philippine agriculture's drift towards increasing
protection has not been prevented under the current WTO
agreement. This is because of the high binding tariffs and the
exemption of rice from coverage. In fact, the increases in the tariff
protection of hogs, poultry, and meat products have been facilitated
to compensate for the high nominal protection of corn. Of course,22 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
tariff ceilings, although initially high, will limit increases in price
protection over the long-term.
The implementation guidelines of the MAV ensure that
quantitative trade restrictions continue to be in effect despite
tariffication. They extend the role of government parastatals,
promote rent-seeking, fragment the budgetary process, and cause
inefficiencies in public expenditure allocation. In any case, the
GATT-URs failure to provide some control over government
parastatal involvement in agricultural trade, often as a monopolist,
also allows WTO member countries to counter the spirit of the
agricultural agreement on market access.
Recent analyses of the Agriculture Agreement now indicate that
any expansion of market access in other countries and improvement
in world prices will be very limited because of the following
(Hathaway and Ingco 1995; Winters 1995; Ingco and Ng 1998): (a)
widespread dirty tariffication; (b) concentration of tariff reductions
on commodities where tariffs were already low; (c) unusually high
tariff equivalent due to low world prices in base year; (d) exemption
of ricefrom coverage in a few countries; and, (e) continued monopoly
power of government parastatals.
Also, the current rules on reduction in aggregate measures of
support and export subsidies will have a limited impact on world
prices for at least two reasons: (1) rules apply to the aggregate and
not to individual commodities allowing some major traded products
to maintain high domestic support and export Subsidies, and (2)
unilateral reductions adopted after the base year of 1986-88 already
form the major part, if not all, of the obligations under the
Agreement.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PROGRAMS
Because of the unique features of agriculture and natural
resources that cause market failures, public expenditures for
providing public goods and addressing externalities in order to
increase productivity, improve market efficiency, and protect the
environment are required if the country's competitive advantage isDAVID "FOODSECURITY I 23
to be enhanced. However, public expenditures have also been aimed
at improving the unequal distribution of income, land ownership,
and access to forest, fishery, and other natural resources. Oftentimes,
public expenditures for price• subsidies, concessional credit
programs, and other types of subsidies are justified on the basis of
mitigating the penalties imposed on agriculture by other economic
policies, particularly price intervention policies. More recently,
significant public resources have also been spent on the rehabilitation
of natural resources-forests, Coral reefs, mangroves, etc. - to reverse
the rapid deterioration of the ecosystem.
Trends Over Time
Public expenditures for agriculture and natural resources in
real terms quickly recovered in the late 1980s, after bearing the brunt
of contractionary policies in the early 1980s (Figure 6). After reaching
a peak around 1990, it began to decline and recovered again in 1995.
As a proportion to GVA and total public expenditures net of debt
service, public expenditures for the sector was already moderately
high at 6-7% in 1987 and about 10% in the late 1990s. However, as
(Figure 7) shows, recovery in public expenditures were initially
allocated to the strengthening of natural resources and
environmental management and rehabilitation of forest and fishery
resources. They also went to rice price stabilization and redistributive
purposes, namely the agrarian reform program and, much less, to
productivity enhancing investments. Irrigation, the single largest
item of public expenditures between 1947 and 1984 (close to half of
agricultural public spending and 20 %of total infrastructure budget),
•dropped sharply since about the mid-1980s, and continued to decline
gradually into the 1990s. Public expenditure for agriculture
increased sharply in 1996 and 1997 •as the government developed
"safety net'; programs for the sector in the aftermath of the
ratification Of the GATT-UR Agriculture Agreement. Irrigation
expenditure increased, but much greater allocations were made in
the category "Others" which consists of subsidies to postharvest
facilities, farm machineries, seed, and other agricultural inputs.24 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Figure 6. Trends in real government expenditures in agriculture (Ga), its ratio
to gross value added in agriculture (GVA), total government
expenditures (G), and G less debt service (G1)
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Allocation by Purpose:
A disaggregation of public expenditure for agricultural and
natural resources between 1987 and 1994 is reported in Table 10.
Close to one-fourth of public expenditure has been allocated for
natural resource and environment, mostly for forest rehabilitation
and protection. Fisheries accounted for only about 15% of that
allocation. Beyond that, public expenditures for agriculture (crops
and livestock) have been mostly for redistributive purposes, with
Table 10. Distribution of public expenditures for agriculture and natural resources by
policy instruments, 1987-94 (P million),
1987-94 1994
Agrarian Reform 32,775 5,179
(26) (24)
Land Acquisition Distribution 16,204 3,272
Support Services 16,571 1,907
Natural Resources 28,602 4,805
and Environment (23) (23)
Fishery 4,240 697
Forestry/o fhers 24,362 4,018
Agriculture 67,675 11,575
(51) " (53)
Irrigation (NIA) 15,600 1,704
(12) (8)
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little regard for their productivity impact. The agrarian reform
program accounted for about one-fourth of total expenditures.
Although about half of that was spent on support services, most of
the so-caLled support services are also redist_ibutive in nature, i.e.,
subsidies for credit programs and inputs, cooperative development,
etc. The budgetary allocation for the National Food Authority (NFA)
responsible for rice price stabilization constitutes nearly 10%, and
this can easily increase to 12% if the cost of market regulations in
other agencies are included.
Only about 30 to 40% of public expenditures for the sector
(representing about 3 % of gross value added of crops and livestock)
have been allocated for productivity-enhancing expenditures, which
the market will not provide. Agricultural research or technology
generation, in particular, is severely underfunded with public
expenditures representing only 0.4% of gross value added in contrast
to an average of 1% among developing countries and 2-3% among
developed countries (Table 11). In fact, only 5% of total public
expenditures for agriculture have been allocated for agricultural
research and 9% for extension. The opportunity cost of
underinvesting in public agricultural research and development in
the sector is high as review of social rates of return estimates
worldwide report this to be in the order of 40-60% (Alston et. al.
1998). The problem, however, is not only with the low level of public
expenditure. Equally important are the inefficiencies caused by the
misallocation of research resources within the sector (e.g., across
research program areas, and ecological regions) and weaknesses in
the institutional framework of the research system including the
organizational structure, lack of accountability, fragmentation of
research, incentive problems, instability in leadership, and weak
linkage between research and extension.
Allocations of research expenditures across commodities and
regions have been highly incongruent to their relative economic
importance in terms of gross value added contribution to total
agriculture of the commodity or region. Relatively greater research
budgets are provided to minor commodities such as cotton, silk, orDAVID:F00D SECURITY 27
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SouthKorea 0.56 1993
Japan 3.36 1992
SOurces:ISNAR; Davidet al. (1998)
carabao, and too•little on majorones such as corn, coconut, fisheries,
•and others (Table12). Mindanao regions are relatively neglected in
terms of research budgets of the DA and SCUs compared to regions
in Luzon and, to a lesser extent, to those in the Visayas (Table 13).
While congruency does not strictly coincide with optimal research
resource allocation, the differences inresearchintensity ratios cannot
be explained by possible differences in cost of research (probability
of research success, etc.), private vs. public sector roles, market
potential, nor of equity considerations.
The allocation of budgetary resources by type of expenditures
affects the productivity of research. As often complained about, too
little. Resources are available to perform research activities and to
properly maintain the physical facilities but only after the salaries
ofpersonnel have been paid. Indeed, the average share ofpersonnel28 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 12. Indicative estimates of research intensity ratio by'commodity 1994-96 (%).
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Forestry 3;5
Source: Davidet al. (1998)
services to direct budgetary outlays is close to 60% to as high as 70-
80%in many cases. Consequently, either the research manpower is
underueillzed and/or the research agenda is driven by donor's
priorities (David et al. 1998).
Public expenditures for agriculture continue to be
disproportionately in favor of the rice sector (about halo which
presently accounts for about 15% ofgross value addedofthesector.
Asidefrom thebudgetarya11ocation forirrigation and price
stabilization, rice dominatesexpenditures forextension, land
redistribution, and credit programs,and subsidies forseeds,
fertilizers, farmmachineries, and postharvest facilities. Yet, the
transition problems encountered withtheintroduction ofmodernTable 13. Distribution of agriculture-related research & development expenditures and gross value added in Agriculture,
199_96 (P million).
R&D Expenditure GVA _ Research Intensity Ratio, (%)
DA Reg. SCUs
Total DA Reg. Offices SCUs Total Offices
Luzon 497.75 151.91 346 183,049 0.272 0.083 0.189
L_ w/o Southern Tagalog 228.34 128.13 100.21 108,700 0.210 0.118 0.092
CAR 20.76 4.74 16.02 7,532 0.276 0.063 0.213
L I_ 62.89 19.15 43.74 22;616 0.278 0.085 0.193
IL Cagayan Valley 59.83 50.44 9.39 20,287 0.295 0.249 0.046
B.I. Central Lttzon 37.43 13.21 24.22 38,286 0.098 0.035 0.063
IV. Southern Tagalog b 269.41 23.78 245.63 74,349 0362 0.032 0.330
V. Bicol 47.43 40.59 6.84 19,979 0.237 0.203 0.034
Visayas 115.97 69.45 46.52 77,634 0.149 0.089 0.060
VI. Western Visayas 31.32 18.36 12.96 43,459 0.072 0.042 0.030
VII. Central Visayas 33.82 33.06 0.76 18,198 0.186 0.182 0.004
VIII. Eastern Visayas 50.83 18.03 32.80 15,977 03i8 0.113 0.205
Mindanao 8432 51.50 33 135,463 0.063 0.038 0.025
IX. Weslem Mindanao 20.29 17.93 2.36 25,631 0.079 0.070 0.009
X. N_r them Mindanao 1Z91 10.17 2.74 34,526 0.037 0.029 0.008
XI. Southern Mindanao 10.99 9.96 1.03 48,448 0.023 0.021 0.002 '-_
XIL Central Mindanao 31.52 4.43 27.09 17,188 0.183 0.026 0.158 0 0
_ARAGA 3.72 3.72 t:_
ARMM 5.29 5.29 9,670 0.055 0.055 ¢t_
total 696.64 271.61 425.03 396,146 0.176 0.069 0.107
total w/o Southern Tagalog 429.03 249.08 179.95 321,797 0.422 0.245 0.177
Includes crops, livestock and fisheries.
blncludes UPLB and UPMSL
,Research intensity Ratio = R&D Expenditure/GVA X 1O0. • tO30 ] JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
rice technology in the late 1960s and the. implementation of land
reform in rice in the mid-1970s (that would have justified subsidies
for credit and modern inputs) a-re -long over. With respect to
production credit for rice, traders, millers, and input dealers have
successfully replaced land owners and rural banks as the major
sources of credit.
Budgetary allocations for the exportable agricultural subsector
have been quite meager in comparison with the 20% implicit tax
indirectly imposed by the ovex.valuation of the exchange rate. An
exception is the major effort to address the_falling productivity of
the coconut industry by financing fertilization and-replanting
through a foreign-funded program. Whereas the distribution of
subsidized fertilizer was on schedule, however, very little progress
has been made on the replanting program where public support is
most needed. Because of uncertainties about land reform,
landowners hesitate to make long-term investments. They prefer to
convert land use to nonagricultural purposes thereby avoiding the
land reform program.
Also, there has been very little effort, thus far, to address the
problem of declining competitive advantage of major import-
competing commodities, particularly corn and sugar, through
productivity-enhancing public expenditure programs..While .....
irrigation investment may not be socially profitable for these
commodities, technology generation in sugar and corn is clearly
underfunded. As has been pointed out above, budgetary allocation
for sugar research has been only about 0.5 % of its contribution to
gros s value added, and for corn, it has been miniscule at less than
0.1%.
Institutional Issues
Cost-effectiveness of the public expenditure program has been
constrained by institutional weaknesses including (a) the
overlapping and fragmentation of responsibilities across agencies;
(b) the emphasis on use of costly regulations and direct production
of support services, rather than use of market-based policyDAVIDFOOD SECURITY 31
instruments and indirect provision of support services; (c)
government's performance of private sector's roles; (d) instability
in leadership positions and consequently, the chain of command
and organizational structure; (e) problems in the design and
implementation of the devolution process; and (f) inadequacies in
the incentive structure and qualifications of staff.
Overlapping and fragmentation. The DENR and DA functions
overlap in promoting sustainable devel_opment in upland areas.
Upland areas with 18% slope or over are under DENR, but it does
not have the comparative advantage to effectively provide the
necessary support services in these areas, which are now largely
under cultivation and pasture grazing. On the other hand, the DA
has historically focused on lowland agriculture, partly due to the
geographical division of responsibilities. Although the DA and
DENR have sometimes developed ad hoc cooperative arrangements
to undertake upland development projects, funded mostly from
foreign sources, these efforts have not been institutionalized.
DAWs involvement in the delivery of support services to
agrarian reform beneficiaries overlap with DA's overall
responsibility for agricultural development. About one-half of the
agrarian reform budget between 1987 and 1994 were allocated for
support services. While only a third of that has been directly
administered by the DAR, the fragmentation of the budgeting
process and the linkage of the support service allocation to land
reform, rather than to technological and market opportunities reduce
the cost-effectiveness of such expenditures. The allocation of DAR's
support services would tend to be biased towards short-term support
projects (e.g., credit subsidies in priority land reform areas) against
institution-building efforts, or projects that may have higher, long-
term economic pay-off (such as agricultural research). Furthermore,
the bureaucratic cost of allocating funds and implementing
agricultural support services in a highly fragmented manner also
increase.
The fragmentation of the agricultural research and extension
system is one of the most important weaknesses of the sector's32 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
institutional structure. Whereas the DA assumes the overall
responsibility for agricultural development and the DENR for the
sustainable management of the natural resources and environment,
the mandate, authority, and budget for technology generation and
dissemination are spread over several agencies under the DOST,
DA, DENR, SCUs and LGUs. Until the AFMA provisions are fully
implemented, the mandate for technology generation in agriculture,
fisheries, and natural resources officially belong to PCARRD and
PCAMRD which are under the DOST. Yet, the Secretary of DOST
does not have any direct responsibility over the productivity
performance of the sector; no comprehensive review process is
conducted; and PCARRD, PCAMRD, SCU's, DA, DENR defend their
budgets separately. Extension function rests primarily on LGUs,
although extension functions within PCA, SRA, NTA, and FIDA
were not devolved.
Considerable overlap and fragmentation of functions also
characterize several agencies within the DA. In livestock alone, there
• are six separate agencies despite the devolution of most of the
• technical regulatory functions, on-site research, and extension. The •
BAI continues to have a Dairy Development Division,
notwithstanding the existence of the NDA. The LDC operations
overlap with BAI in several aspects including policy formulation,
livestock development and monitoring and developing contac_ with
the priva[e sector. Furthermore, the LDC has directly administered
a number of livestock development projects using the Dairy
Development Fund generated from cattle registration fees.
NAFC likewise perform functions beyond its mandate as a
consultative body. Due to the additional assignment to monetize
and allocate the proceeds of commodity grants, it.has become a
funding unit for a variety of projects, as well as an implementor of
livelihood and other projects. The ACPC has become involved in
the administration of credit programs, a task that is beyond its staff
functions.
Irrigation development in DA is the responsibility of two
agencies: the NIA for national gravity and deep tubewell systems,DAVID" FOODSECURITY 33
and the BSWM for the small water impounding and shallow
tubewell projects. A separate corporation for cotton exists, together
with FIDA, though fiber is a relatively minor crop.
Cost of market regulations. A major part of theagricultural
bureaucracy has been concerned with direct marketing operations
of rice and administering market interventions arising •from the
pervasive use of quantitative trade restrictions. The NFA operations
alone accounted for about 27% of the total budge t of the DA and its
agencies, and employed more than 5000 staff. Several commodity-
based agencies are also heavily involved in administering market
regulations, e.g., SRA (sugar), BA! (livestock), BPI (seeds and others),
NTA (tobacco). The pervasive market interventions not only bloated
the bureaucracy and shifted scarce budgetary resources away from
growth-enhancing activities but these also promoted rent-seeking
among government employees engaged in trading, allocating
import/export permits, issuing licenses, and so forth.
With the genuine abolition of quantitative trade restrictions
under the WTO, many of the staff in the above commodity-based
agencies will become redundant, requiring major institutional
adjustments. Although rice has been exempted from the WTO
agreements, the high budgetary cost of NFA operations should
warrant a shift towards more cost-effective, indirect policy
instruments to•achieve the same objectives.
Private Roles. Besides involvement in agricultural marketing
activities, the DA and its attached agencies have been engaged in
several other activities that are basically private sector functions.
While the original intention may be to initiate the activity as a means
of promoting private sector investments, the opposite often prevail
because the heavy subsidies on government operations create unfair
competition. Moreover, even though there are economic
justifications for government provision or subsidies of such goods
and services, these are often more cost-effectively produced by the
private sector. For example, the government engages in activities
that are essentially private in nature, such as providing veterinary34 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and artificial insemination services, operating animal stock farms
and dairy processing facilities, and producing breeding animals. The
other examples are the operations of fishing ports and cold storage
facilities (PFDA), general cold storage and warehousing facilities
(FTI), and tomato canning factory in Northern Luzon.
Commodity-basedStructure. The current organizational structure
reflects the proliferation of agricultural commodity-based agencies
in the 1960s and the 1970s. Although these have been brought under
the DA in 1986, they have remained largely intact as attached
agencies, retaining the weakened controls and accountability in their
bureaucracies and constraining coordination of research and
extension. The commodity-based structure of the DA leads to
fragmentation of the agricultural bureaucracy and contributes to
instability and inflexibility. The creation of more and more
commodity-based agencies has been largely motivated by political
and economy factors rather than on consistent, sound, and logical
criteria. Moreover, the commodity-based structure tends to favor
regulations against growth-enhancing activities-research,
extension, irrigation- which have longer term pay-off. Regulations
are easy to implement, have short-term impacts, generate resources
for the agency, and rents for those involved in allocating import/
export permits, issuing licenses, and so forth. In contrast, well-
documented justifications and record of performance are necessary
to raise budgetary support for productivity-enhancing activities.
Furthe.rmore, heads of commodity agencies are typically
nontechnical persons who may not fully appreciate the potential
contributions of technological change and the scientific skills and
different type of management style required for producffve research.
Devolution Process
The devolution of responsibilities for delivering front-line
services from the national to local government units is potentially
one of the most important institutional reforms for improving the
efficiency of providing public support services and effecting a
bottom-up approach to development. However, major flaws in theDAVID :FOODSECURITY 35
design and implementation of the LGC have hindered the realization
of those potential benefits.
Incomplete devolution. The devolution is not complete. Although
about one-third of DA staff has been devolved, extension agents of
the attached agencies/corporations of the DA such as PCA, FIDA,
SRA and NTA have not been covered by the devolution. Neither
has any personnel from NIA been devolved to LGUs, despite the
transfer of responsibilities of communal and other small-scale
irrigation projects.
Funding constraints. The shift in national budgetary allocation
was much less than commensurate to the responsibilities devolved
to the LGUs. The problem was exacerbated by the bias in fund
allocation in favor of cities and barangays and urbanized LGUs
against the more rural provinces and municipalities, which carry
the bulk of responsibilities related to agriculture and natural
resources (Manasan 1995). Moreover, poorer regions which have a
greater proportion of population dependent in agriculture,
particularly the upland regions, have lower total budgetary resources
and relatively fewer devolved personnel due to the same bias in the
original personnel allocation of DA regional offices (Cabanilla 1995).
Finally, the mechanisms for LGUs to directly manage foreign-funded
projects have not been fully developed. These foreign-funded
projects are a major source of funding for irrigation and natural
resource and environment management projects at the national level.
Hence, the ability of the LGUs to effectively carry out their
responsibilities in the sector has been adversely affected by funding
constraints.
About 80% of budgetary allocations by LGUs for agriculture,
veterinary, and natural resource services are spent on salaries and
wages of personnel, although the average for total LGU budget is
only 50%. Salaries of LGU personnel, particularly in poorer regions,
have fallen behind equivalent national level staff. Salaries of
agriculture-related personnel in poorer regions have also lagged
behind other technical staff because of mandated allowances and
salaries for DOH personnel, causing widespread demoralization."36 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Given the bias in personnel allocation and funding availability
against poorer regions, it is not surprising to find in several case
•studies that agricultural support services have expanded in the more
progressive areas but deteriorated in the poorer LGUs (CabaniUa
1995).
Delineation of responsibilities. Delineation of responsibilities in
many areas is unclear and/or not well understood. For example,
interviews with municipal-level staff suggest that many LGUs do
not as yet consider the development of communal and smallscal_e •.I •::•
irrigation as an integral part of their functions. LGU involvement
in irrigation, so far, has been simply to facilitate the implementation
of national projects by identifying potential irrigable areas or
recipients of shallow tubeweUs, assisting in distribution of tubewells,
and overseeing the construction of small water impounding projects.
Role of National Agencies. Considerable efforts were devoted to
the orderly transfer of personnel from the DA to the LGUs. However,
the DA did not systematically anticipate, monitor, and address the
problems faced by the devolved personnel in their new roles, as
well as by the LGU heads in taking responsibility for the devolved
functions. For example, the provincial and municipal agricultural
officers and other devolved personnel have been used to
implementing programs conceived and designed at the central
offices. Indeed, the field personnel were still in the process of being
• transformed from being specialists into generalists, capable of
dealing equally well with all aspects of farming sYstems under the
decentralized DA structure. Therefore, a strong concerted effort to
assist LGU personnel in developing new skills, attitudes, and mode
of operation should be mounted to effectively functio14 in their new,
more independent role.
There was also little effort to establish specific guidelines,
procedures and institutional mechanisms for interaction among •
LGUs to resolve common problems and harmonize programs; an4
between national agencies and LGUs for developing joint programs
and effecting a bottom-up appr6ach of governance. As an example,
the spread of the hoof and mouth disease in wide areas of Luzon inDAVID : FOODSECURITY 37
1995 was caused primarily by the limited coordination of efforts
between local and national agencies.
The LGC did not specify any mechanism of interaction among
_gricultural personnel across municipalities and between
municipalities and the provinces, it was not until late 1995, as the
need became apparent, that municipal and provincial agricultural
officers decided to form associations as venues for such interactions
and as a mechanism for organizing their interaction with DA.
The interactions between LGUs and national agencies continue
to be largely ad hoc and top down in the nature of getting nationally
conceived and funded programs such as the GPEP, Gintong Ani
and, now, the Makamasa programs implemented by the LGUs.
Developing appropriate mechanisms for interaction between LGUs
and national level agencies will likely be frustrated by weaknesses
in the institutional structure of agriculture-related agencies at the
national level, specifically their highly fragmented and largely
overlapping nature. The problem is especially critical in trying to
link the extension and agricultural research, which is conducted
independently by a wide variety of institutions. Thus far, only the
organizational structure of regional offices were reorganized.
However, even this new interim structure does not reflect any
attempt to reorient the relationship between the central and regional
offices and the field personnel under the LGUs. There is clearly a
need to restructure the Department of Agriculture and agencies
related to it in order to achieve an efficient working relationshi p
with the LGUs.
WEAK PROPERTY RIGHTS STRUCTURE
As the rate of population growth continue to be high, the supply
of land has increasingly become scarce. Cultivation frontier has
moved progressively into the marginal upland areas, while
widespread deforestation, soil erosion, and intensive cultivation
have degraded land quality. To maintain agricultural
competitiveness, long-term investments in land improvements and
flexibility in land market transactions (sales and rental) are necessary.38 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
This will facilitate changes in land use/cropping patterns as well as
land management arrangements (small vs. large farm vs. contract
farming, etc.). However, the government policy of generally
retaining ownership of lands with slope beyond 18 degrees and
agrarian reform programs have inadvertently stifled efficient
operation of land markets, lowered incentives for long-term
investments in land improvements and tree crops, and eroded
collateral level of land. These effects are reflected in the declining
ratio of agricultural loans to gross value added in agriculture and
total loans reported in Table 14.
Table 14. Trends in loans granted to agriculture in real terms (1985 prices)
and as percentages of •gross value added in agriculture and total loans granted.
Agricultural Agricultural loans as % of
• loans GVA Total
(I_million) loan_
1970 24,196 33 12
1975 30,882 29 6
1980 53,480 47 9
1985 28,050 26 8
1990 25,774 21 6
1993 27,054 21 2
Except for 1960 and 1993, all years are three-year averages centered at year shown.
Source: Agricultural Credit and Productivity Council
Upland Policies
Since most of the uplands is still classified as public lands, full
property rights cannot be conferred, even in slightly sloping areas
suitable for crop production, agro-forestry, or livestock pasture. A
variety of user-rights arrangements have been instituted such as
Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSC), Community Forest
Management (CFMA), Industrial Forestry Management
Arrangements (IFMA), pasture leases, and so forth. CSCs areDAVIDFOODSECURITY 39
granted to small upland dwellers, but area coverage of these as well
as the CFMAs and IFMAs are still relatively small. Moreover, these
property rights instruments do not have collateral value because of
the limited terms of tenure and non-transferability. A 25-year tenure
(renewable once) would still be short in relation to the growth period
of forest products. On the other hand, the very low rental fee for
pasture leases have led to excess demand and, consequently, to
allocation of these rights in large parcels to politically powerful
families, leading to inefficient management of these lands.
Agrarian Reform
To address the highly unequal distribution of rural incomes
caused by the inequitable distributionof lands, a series of land reform
programs have been instituted starting with the 1963 law (RA 3844)
which fixed the sharing ratio between tenants and landlords. Land
transfer was effected for rice and corn areas by Presidential Decree
27 signed in 1972. This decree spelled out the three steps to effect
land transfer: first, with the conversion of tenancy arrangements
from share tenancy to leasehold; second, the issuance of Certificates
of Land Transfer where payments to landlords or the Land Bank
are considered amortizations; and finally, the granting of
emancipation patents or title of ownership.
In 1987, RA 6675, better known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), was passed which aims at the
redistribution of all agricultural lands to tillers, together with fair
compensation to the landowners. The Program was designed not
only to include land redistribution, but also the provision of support
services to beneficiaries. Due to inherent political difficulties and
high cost of implementing the land transfer program, progress had
been slow and the target hectarage had not been met by the ending
date of the Program in 1998.
Certain provisions of the agrarian reform programs, as well as
CARP's slow implementation have increased distortions in land
markets with unintended negative effects:
* Share tenancy was made illegal, even if such labor-land market40 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
arrangements may be efficient and a means for landless
households to step up the agricultural ladder.
- * Under PD 27, when land reform was confined to rice and corn,
landowners were discouraged from growing these crops in areas
where intercropping of rice or corn with coconut or other crops
have been traditionally practiced.
• Premature conversion of agricultural land use to non-
agricultural purposes is induced and facilitated by weak controls
and lack of national land-use or zoning policy.
• Prohibition of private land sales, even after land reform has
been effected, erode collateral value of land in the formal credit
market. This is particularly detrimental for the promotion of
investments in land development and tree crop farming, and
the cultivation of nontraditional crops requiring more cash
inputs.
• The linking of CARP implementation to provision of support
services lowers efficiency in the delivery of such services as short-
term, subsidy-type instruments tend to be funded rather than
long-term productivity-enhancing public investments.
Even the threat of land reform inevitably discouraged
agricultural investments. In particular, those with long gestation
periods, such as the growing of tree crops, land development,
irrigation, and so forth, because of the risk of not reaping returns on
investments. Although it is very difficult to .document these effects
rigorously, casual evidence abounds. For example, while the cutting
of coconut trees for lumber is widely observed, the replanting
program funded by a World Bank loan has had limited demand. In
sugar, there has been no significant investment in the modernization
of sugar mills even though milling efficiency is much below other
countries, nor in farm mechanization despite rising real wages and
relative large farm size. Rice production has grown at a faster rate
than other major crops because the land transfer program under PD
27 has been largely completed by the 1980s. Several large-scale
plantation projects in palm oil, rubber, and bananas as Proposed byDAVID "FOODSECURITY ' 41
multinational corporations have not materialized because of
rigidities in land market.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall the policy and institutional framework continues to be
a constraint in achieving sustainable growth of the agricultural sector
and, thus, to an efficient path to food security. While price
intervention policies have become more favorable to the sector, these
have been achieved by increasing protection of major import-
competing commodities and reducing implicit tariffs on inputs
rather than reducing disincentives on exportable commodities
caused by distortions in exchange rates. Thus, improvements in
agricultural incentives have occurred at the cost of greater
inefficiencies in resource allocation arising from widening distortions
in prices within agriculture, and between agriculture and agro-
processing. Higher food prices have also had adverse effects on
equity because a greater majority of the rural and urban poor are
net buyers of the highly protected food commodities. The high and
wide dispersion of tariffs among close substitutes promotes rent-
seeking. Technical smuggling of cattle and wheat, for example, will
intensify given the large differential tariff between breeders/
fatteners and beef and between feed wheat and wheat for food.
The wide distortions Of prices within agriculture are particularly
detrimental not only to the growth and employment objective of
the whole economy but to the agricultural sector itself. Since supply
of land which is a major input in agricultural production is
essentially fixed, artificially raising profitability of rice, corn, and
sugar increases the cost of land for other crops. Consequently,
competitive advantage of exportable agricultural commodities in
the world market is reduced indirectly. Growth potentials of the
hog and poultry industries are high and their contributions to gross
value added in agriculture and labor and land productivity are even
higher than its most important input, corn. Accordingly, corn's high
price policy has hindered the international competitiveness of the
hog industry (consisting mostly of small, backyard producers), as42 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
studies of the country's comparative advantage in hog production
have shown (Gonzales and Perez 1991).
The very high protection for sugar hurts not only the consuming
household, but also the food processing industry, which accounts
for over 40% and 20%, respectively, of manufacturing value added
and employment. In contrast to sugar, clearly an import-competing
agricultural product for which domestic consumers have to pay
about twice as much as world price, the food processing industries
heavily using sugar as an input has greater export potential, At
least 25% of domestic production of processed vegetables, fruits,
chocolate, and sugar confectioneries are exported.
The excessively high protection of a number of food commodities
have had adverse effects on equity because a great majority of the
rural and urban poor are net buyers of these highly protected food
commodities. High food prices also put pressure on wages as
evidenced by the clamor for increasing minimum wages resulting
from the food price-induced inflation in recent years. High wages
make our labor-intensive manufacturing industries less competitive
in relation to the low wage cheap food economies such as Vietnam
and China.
The inefficiencies caused by price intervention policies are not
only through the distortions in incentives but also through the choice
of policy instruments. Continued use of quantitative trade
restrictions and government's direct and indirect involvement in
agricultural imports, rather than using tariffs, promotes rent-seeking,
reduces government revenues, incurs significant bureaucratic cost,
and introduces price uncertainties. Recent policy changes in
response to the WTO agreement seems to have exacerbated rather
than mitigated such problems.
Although public expenditures for agriculture has recovered in
the late 1980s (after bearing the brunt of contractionary policies
earlier in the decade), much of that recovery was allocated for
redistributive purposes (agrarian reform and market subsidies) and
strengthening of natural resource and environmental management,
rather than on long-term productivity-enhancing investments toDAVID'FOODSECURITY 43
reverse the declining competitive advantage of the sector. The
continued use of quantitative trade restrictions not only limited the
generation of tax revenues but dissipated scarce government
resources on the high cost of administering market regulations,
particularly NFA operations. In particular, agricultural research
has been severely underfunded with public expenditures
representing only 0.3% of gross value added in agriculture, in
contrast to 1% among developing countries and 2-3% among
developed countries. Budgetary allocations have also continued to
be disproportionately in favor of the rice sector, with very meager
allocations to other major commodities such as corn and others. On
the other hand, public investments for market infrastructure also
continue to favor large urban centers particularly those close to Metro
Manila.
The issue is not only the level of public expenditure and its
allocation. Equally important are the inefficiencies caused by poor
choices of program instruments, faulty budgetary process and
planning approach, and weaknesses in the bureaucracy in terms of
organizational structure, incentive problems, transitional difficulties
with devolution, and instability in leadership. In particular, the
fragmentation of the research and development system, as well as
the weak linkage between research and extension have failed to
promote technological development in many key commodities such
as corn, coconut, sugar and other traditional crops. Moreover, the
weak planning, political factors, and excessive graft and corruption
have lowered effectiveness of public investments in market and
irrigation infrastructure.
While the property rights policies, both for public and private
lands, arewell-intended as environmental and equity objectives,
slow implementation and certain provisions that limit these property
rights (in terms of length of tenure and transferability) have
inadvertently had negative effects. Land market transactionshave
been greatly hindered, incentives for long-term investments lowered,
collateral value of land eroded, and land conversions from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses accelerated.44[ JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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